Chapter (II)

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Axiology, which stems from two Greek words - axios or worth, and logos or reason, theory - is a relatively new discipline. "In the twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul Lapie (Logique de la Volonte, 1902) and E. von Hartmann (Grundriss der Axiology, 1908)." (The Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. T. Runes, Philosophical Library.) The problems and issues axiology investigates have been with us from the moment man began to reflect upon conditions of his life, the structure of reality, the order of nature and man's place in it. In all probability the quest for values, for things and events which are conducive to survival and the enhancement of life, engendered the quest for knowledge of reality. By his very nature, man has been primarily interested in how things and events administer to- his basic and derivative needs, how they satisfy or frustrate him, how to preserve and promote the good things of life and curtail and erase objects which stifle his zest for living. A mere glance at the history of philosophy shows how deeply man has been preoccupied with the nature of values. The notions of good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly are as old as the real and apparent. Valuational preferences are not artifacts we can dispense with. Inquiry into the claims, truth, and validity of-value judgments is a necessity of life itself. The concept of value permeates our life at every step. We prefer one thing to

another, we shift our attention from one event to another, we praise one behavior and condemn another, we like and dislike, and whenever we do it we value. Behind our passions, interests, a purposive action is the belief that they are worthwhile. We attach to them different degrees of importance or value. We speak about good and bad aims, noble and mean actions‹ beautiful and ugly objects, pious and impious intentions and deeds. Our whole life moves between attraction and repulsion. Events are alluring‹ enhancing, fascinating or repugnant, loathsome, and obnoxious. In fact‹ we not only value, but are always conscious of a scale of values, which scale rests with degree and quality of satisfactions. While reflections on value have been with us since man began to articulate the salient features of his conscious experiences, axiology as a separate discipline is of recent origin. Philosophers in the past hardly separated axiological issues from metaphysical and epistemological. There was an intense and diversified thinking on values, but this thinking was loose and usually confined to particular values, be it ethical, aesthetic, or religious values. Modern axiological studies usually confine themselves to the following problems: What is the common nature of values? What is the status of values? Are they mere responses of man to a value-neutral nature or are they results of an ongoing interaction of reality and man? Is the scientific method of inquiry applicable to value judgments? What is the distinctive nature of value propositions? Are values relative to the social environment which sanctions certain valuations or do we have a standard of values which transcends given individual and social idiosyncrasies? Can there be a gain

in knowledge of values? These and similar questions comprise the subject matter of axiology.

The great interest in axiology at the present has many reasons: the divorce of ontological and valuational questions, the ever-widening gap between physical and humanistic studies, the vogue of relativistic beliefs and the literary influence exercised by Brentano, Ehrenfels, and Moinong. For the ancient and medieval mind the real and valuable were the same. The valuable, although contingent upon man's cognitions, has an independent status. Values were conceived of as independent of man Modern philosophy became skeptical as to the identity of the real and valuable. With the rapid advance of physical science the various studies of man have developed a complacency, in being satisfied with the many causal, genetic, and social determinants of values. The normative aspect of values has been eschewed. The most important influence on contemporary value theories stems from Nietzsche, Brentano, Ehrenfels, and Meinong. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, 1887 brought to the fore a problem that has been neglected - the evaluation of values. By putting emphasis on the genetic and comparative approach to moral values, Nietzsche made us aware of the evolution of values in the course of years. Brentano (Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, 1874), (Vom Urspring der Sittlichen Erkenntnis, 1889), divides psychic life into ideas judgments, and the attitudes of love and hate. The latter share with judgments affirmation and negation, acceptance and rejection. According to Brentano, there is an analogy between judgments of truth and judgments of value.

The latter are contingent upon the cognitive intuition or right love which grasps the rightness of an object. For Ehrenfels (System der Wertlehre, 1897) value is contingent upon desire. "We desire things not because we comprehend some ineffable quality 'value' in them but we ascribe value to them because we desire them". For Meinong (Zur Grundlegung der Allgemeinen Wertlehre, 1923(value is contingent upon feeling. He is aware of the referential meaning of our emotions, and includes judgments as a necessary presupposition of every value experience. While Ehrenfels and Memiong agree that the occurrence of an intrinsic value is contingent upon desire or emotions، neither of them denies that the occurrence of intrinsic values is predicated on objectively ascertained capacities of an object. Ehrenfels, like Dewey, makes a distinction between valuing as mere praising, and valuation as appraisal. He restricts value judgments to the latter. The Ehrenfels-Meinong controversy as to the primacy of desire or feeling in our intrinsic value experience influenced R. B. Perry and D. W. Prall. For both, values are rooted in our conative and affective responses, neither of which is an isolated psychological datum. They are results of an ongoing transaction between ourselves and the various environments. Perry's approach is behavioristic, Prall's introspective. Perry's General Theory of Value (1926) is one of the most systematic axiological treatises. He defines value in terms of interest. Interest, for Perry, is a necessary condition for "anything's possessing or acquiring the quality of value ... for anything known to be valuable..." By viewing interest or taking interest in behavioral terms, as an activity embedded in the wide context of reality,

Perry influenced Dewey's axiological naturalism. Perry realized that value cannot be treated as a mere quality of an object nor as mere mental quality of a subject. Value is a relation between an object and an interest-taking subject. Prall's A Study in the Theory of Value (1921) sees in cur affective states, such as liking, favoring, delightful contemplation, an essential constituent of value, but the value is more than an objectified feeling‹ for the immediate liking is predicated on ascertained qualities of an object. In his Aesthetic Judgment (1929) Prall makes a clear distinction between a mere subjective imputing of valuational qualities and an objective imputing of values. The latter is determined by "the properties of things as well as by the properties of minds or bodies that see these things so qualified, by physical conditions, in other words."

Axiological Platonism

Plato's theory of ideas is a strange mixture of logic, psychology, ethics‹ and metaphysics. Plato conceives of ideas as universals which stand for common properties of symbols designating referents; as ideals we project as visions of the better we arrive at by reflecting on the precariousness and imperfections of reality; and as metaphysical entities or essences which are supposed to comprise the higher form of reality. The latter are alleged to be immutable, nonspatial, and nontemporal. His theory of ideas has influenced many thinkers in the past, and is influencing many contemporary thinkers. The perplexing problem of universals has hardly reached a satisfactory solution, contrary to the claims of many positivistic nominalists. Here one is reminded of Wittgenstein's efforts to determine the

nature of a universal, his notion of family meanings or resemblances. The Platonic blend of logic and metaphysics is still noticeable in Whitehead and Husserl, not to mention the neoKantian philosophers. His explanation of ideas as ideals had a great influence on Dewey, with the difference that for Dewey the real and ideal are not dichotomous, but rather exhibit an ongoing continuum. In the axiological field Plato influenced many thinkers: W. M. Urban، Royce, Bradley, Alexander, and Whitehead. The most original and most comprehensive Platonic axiologists are Scheler and Hartmann. Scheler's Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, (1913-1916)، Nature and Forms of Sympathy, (1923), and Hartmann's Ethik, (1925) are landmarks in the ethical literature. Both display insights into man's moral consciousness on its highest reflective level. Both have a great deal to say about the modes of apprehending values, about the historical limitations and determinants of value experiences. As to the nature of values themselves, both subscribe to Platonism. The basic values have an ideal being and a rank independent of recognition. Their ideal being is similar to the being of logical norms of numbers. We intuit them by a higher feeling as ideal entities, although their realization in our moral conduct depends upon our efforts. Here are a few quotations from Scheler and Hartmann which clearly indicate their axiological Platonism.

"There are genuine and true value qualities which constitute an independent realm of objects; they are distinctly felt objective values".

(Scheler)

"In their mode of existence values are Platonic ideas." (Hartmann)

"There is continuous unfolding of new ethical value concepts. No trans-valuation of values, but a reevaluation of life. In the revolution of the ethos, the values themselves do not change. Their nature is timeless‹ super-historical. But the consciousness of them evolves." (Hartmann).

Axiological Intuitionism

The belief in intuition as a source and way of knowing is as old as philosophy itself. We find this- belief in epistemology, ontology, formal disciplines as well as in the field of values. From Plato on philosophers have distinguished three kinds of knowledge: knowledge based on perceptive data, discursive, syllogistic reasoning, and self-evident immediate‹ intuitive knowledge. The meanings of intuition itself varies widely from one type of philosophy to another. The most common usages of intuition are: (1) intuition as a unique grasp -of the ideal entities which comprise the only true being (Plato); (2) intuition as a mystical union with the Divine (Meister Eckhart); (3) intuition as self-evident knowledge of nature or God (Spinoza); (4) intuition as a tool of comprehending the inwardness and duration of life (Bergson); (5) intuition as awareness of the immediate data of consciousness (Santayana); (6) intuition as knowledge by acquaintance (Russel); (7) intuition as a faculty of the intentional consciousness (Husserl); (8) intuition as a fund of knowledge in the sense of intellectually cumulative experiences (Dewey). In axiology too we find many exponents

of intuitive knowledge. Value intuitionists believe that certain actions are known to be good or bad، right or wrong, by a direct, immediate, noninferential intuition of their ethical, nonnatural but cognitive qualities. These basic concepts are simple, indefinable, ultimate, and cognitively unique. They cannot be translated into any natural terms, and yet statements containing these terms are synthetic, that is, informative about reality. Axiological intuitionists claim value objectivity. Values can be apprehended intuitively by anyone who has developed value consciousness. Platonists are axiological realists and intuitionists. Scheler and Hartmann are the most distinguished among contemporary Platonists. The British Moral Sense theorists (Hutchison, Price, Reid, Shaftesbury) veer toward intuitionism. The classical representatives of ethical intuitionism are Moore and Ross. In his Principia Ethica Moore views the notion of good as central to his ethics. The good as an intrinsic value, which exists for its own sake, is irreducible to any other more basic notions. By intuitive introspections we grasp his simple, irreducible, nonnatural, cognitive meaning. The right Moore defines as any action conducive to the good. Ross in his The Right and The Good, and Foundations of Ethics، views the right or the morally obligatory as the most essential moral notion. The intrinsic moral rightness is indefinable, cognitive, and non-natural. Instances of ultimate or prima facie rightness are promise-keeping, fidelity, truth-telling, justice, and non-maleficence. They are of an intuitive, non-prudential, and nonteleogical obligatoriness. Ross was strongly influenced by Prichard.

Axiological Emotivism

Clarity of language and logical rigor are desirable features of any rational discourse, no matter what its subject matter may be. Logical positivism made us aware that clarity of language and clarity of thought go hand in hand. The greater scientific-mindedness of contemporary philosophy (with the exception of existentialism) is the legacy of logical positivism. Cognizant of the idols of the theatre (Bacon), we have become suspicious of synoptic systems based on arbitrary manipulations of concepts detached from reality. We detest plethora as of words, redundant expressions, metaphysical excursions in a realm of essences‹ and reject any truth which remains a private, intuitive experience. But with the purge of metaphysics, positivism moved into another extreme. The hostility to speculations begot the complacency that semantic and logical analyses are the only legitimate tests of philosophy. To live up to these aims, positivists began to reject one problem after another. Any issue became a pseudo-issue the moment its initial formulation did not fit into preconceived notions of meaningfulness and verification. Most positivists restrict the term scientific to two kinds of propositions; analytic or a priori, and synthetic or a posteriori or empirical. Analytic statements (mathematics and logic) assert nothing about the external world. They are based on stipulations how to use certain terms. Synthetic statements which inform us of the external world are hypothetical propositions which are verified or verifiable by some sense data. This strict dichotomy advanced by Hume removes value judgments from a scientific discourse. Instead of

realizing that this strict division cannot account for value judgments, positivitsts to preserve the Humean dichotomy reject value statements as pseudo-statements and find in the vague notion of emotive meaning a simple solution to the difficult problem of valuations and values.

Ayer (1920-) became the classical exponent of the axiological emotivism. In his Language, Truth, and Logic he rejects naturalistic and non-naturalistic value theories. Value terms such as good, bad, right، wrong, are meaningless as normative concepts, and statements in which they appear are pseudo-propositions. "The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone or the exclamation marks add nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker".

Ethical symbols express feeling and statements containing ethical symbols are "unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable-because they do not express genuine propositions." Aesthetic judgments, according to Ayer, are used in the same way as ethical judgments. By using them we express certain feelings and try to

evoke certain responses. Ayer does not deny that the description of a work of art can be true or false. Ayer disregards the fact that an empirical description of a work of art is the basis of our reflective evaluative judgment that it is beautiful. The normative element of value term is intimately connected with its descriptive content. Apart from the factual concatenation our value terms lose their cognitive import. Ayer's analysis disregards the fusion of the normative and dkscriptive role of our value terms. How mere interjections can influence people remains a puzzle. The persuasive force of emotive words rests with their close connection with facts which they epitomize and appraise. Ayer artificially eliminates from any value discourse sociological، psychological, and physical data with the result of an analysis of language of values which becomes a travesty of facts. A proper elucidation of concepts is predicated on a thorough integration of scientific findings from various studies. Axiological emotivists are either not acquainted with such findings or disregard them. Psychological studies reveal that emotions are intimately connected with perceptions, conations, and cognitions.

Ayer was influenced by Carnap who denies any propositional status to ethical judgments. The latter are commands expressed in declarative statements. "Killing is evil" has no other meaning for him than the injunction do not kill. That we do make a distinction between good and bad commands escapes his attention.

A somewhat milder form of value emotivism was developed by Stevenson (1908-). In his The Nature of Ethical Disagreements

he distinguishes between cognitive beliefs and emotional attitudes. The latter may be immune to the former. In the light of contemporary psychology, fixed unchangeable valuational attitudes do not prove that our essential values are opaque to experience and reason. They rather disclose emotional immaturity or strong social pressures to conform to spurious values.

Patrick H. Nowell Smith (1914-) points out the multiple functions of value terms, especially ethical terms which we use not only to express and arouse feeling, but also to prescribe, urge, condemn, and advise.

At present linguistic analyses abound in literature. The result is not a very impressive one. One cannot help feeling that the same effort which goes into linguistic analysis could be more fruitful in finding the proper causes in valuational disagreements which on a mere verbal level cover up clumsy rationalizations of an obsolete value parochialism which under the pretext of value subjectivism and relativism refuses to acknowledge that the good things in life are common ends. We do not talk past another in ethical issues because of the ambiguity of moral terms. We do so for other reasons, for reasons of social frustrations, social blocks in our actions. An elimination of such impediments is a more adequate means to a successful adjustment and communication than mere linguistic scrutinies, which in order to satisfy our inveterate urge for neat classification, very often makes us blind to the very data of experience we attempt to articulate. The existing class antagonisms, the real deprivations of economic and social

nature, the narrowness of group participation, and the innumerable barriers which stand in the way of a full realization of our actual needs and ideal aspirations-these are the crucial elements behind our poor ethical communication.

John Dewey (1859-1952): Axiological Naturalism

The problem of valuation and values was the central issue in Dewey's writings. Almost every one of his major books discusses the nature of value judgments. Whether we read his Quest for Certainty, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Human Nature and Conduct, Ethics, Art as Experience, and Theory of Valuation, his value naturalism in the light of a pragmatic epistemology is the central theme.

Dewey's value naturalism is best understood in the light of the criticism of the emotive theory of value and value-Platonism. Value emotivism, he correctly maintains, treats emotions and desires as discrete units of experience. In reality, experience reveals a continuity of sensations, desires, emotions, and cognitions. They are rooted in the wider context of reality. Because we continuously interact with objects, events، and persons, none of our psychic functions can be treated in isolation.

Apart from adhering to an obsolete atomistic phychology, value emotivists fail to realize that the characterization of value terms and value statements as mere ejaculations (like hurrah) hardly qualify them to talk about ethical or aesthetic feelings, since interjections have no cognitive meanings whatsoever.

Applying the term ethical or aesthetical involves some objective ground for "discriminating and identifying them as of a certain kind," a conclusion utterly inconsistent with descriptions of value terms as mere interjections.

Dewey is equally critical of value-Platonism, or the belief in values as perfect entities or essences apart from the realm of facts. The realm of immutable, nonspatial, nontemporal values is an hypostatization of our craving for certainty in the face of the ever-changing precarious reality and of our intellectual inertia which makes us sidetrack the difficult problem of valuation. To dream about a world replete with perfect essences is one thing, but to project our dreams as given real objects is to forsake intelligence in our valuational preferences.

Dewey, like any other naturalist, connects values with feelings, interests, desires, but this connection is for him not a final datum. It is rather a starting point for further investigation, just as a connection of reality with perceptions is. Since feelings, desires, cognitions are continuously interacting with reality, they must be studied in close relation with objects, events, and persons. They must be studied in their genetic and causal sequences. None of our psychic functions constitutes a value; for value traits like good, bad, beautiful, ugly, poignant, are for Dewey as real as sounds and colors. The real problem for Dewey is the distinction between genuine and spurious values, and the corresponding distinction between genuinely satisfied desires, and casual fleeting desires. Dewey restricts value propostions to the desirable, likeable, approvable. They, like all judgments of facts, ascertain antecedent and consequent

factors of desires and make prediction as to future occurrences. Statements of what we like, desire, are no proper value judgments. They merely record what we like and dislike.

Norms of appraisal are not confined to moral or aesthetic judgments. Every recurrent form of activity developes rules as to the best ways to accomplish ends in view or objects of our interests and desires. Appraisals "have to do with things as they sustain to each other the relation of means to ends or consequences ... the appraisal is a valuation of things with respect to their serviceability or needfulness." The intimate relationship of ends and means, their mutual influence and dependence, leads Dewey to reject the prevailing dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic values. For him, both stand in the relationship of a continuum. Means may gain an intrinsic character, and intrinsic ends may become, in a given context, extrinsic means.

True to his spirit of naturalism, Dewey derives norms for valuative criticism from experience itself. The change from unreflective, impulsive‹ and customary value judgments to critical appraisals is the result of learning from experience. "Observation of results obtained, of actual consequences and their agreement with and difference from ends anticipated or held in view, thus provides the conditions by which desires and interests (and hence valuations) are matured and tested. Nothing more contrary to common sense can be imagined than the notion that we are incapable of changing our desires and interests by means of learning what the consequences of acting upon them are or, as it is sometimes put, of indulging them."

The result of an empirical and intelligent appraisal is the notion of the "desirable." The implicit oughtness of the "desirable" rests with our ability to transform any experience into a cumulatively intellectual experience.

Dewey's axiology must be understood in the light of his zest for moral reconstruction, which is based on the valuational commitment that social well-being ought to be the guiding norm. Once we share his idealistic commitment, we cannot help but concur with him that:

"When theories of values do not afford intellectual assistance on forming ideas and beliefs about values that are adequate to direct action‹ the gap must be filled by other means. If intelligent method is lacking‹ prejudice, the pressure of immediate circumstance, self-interest and classinterest, traditional customs, institutions of accidental historic origin‹ are not lacking, and they tend to take the place of intelligence".

Dewey's major thesis of continuity of facts and values is shared by many philosophers. Among them the most important exponents of axiological naturalism are Lewis, Russell, and Pepper.

Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) published in 1946 An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Here he deals with the problem of evaltation in a manner similar to Dewey. Evaluations are for Lewis "a form of empirical knowledge, not fundamentally different in what determines

their truth and falsity, and what determines their validity, from other kinds of empirical knowledge." Following Dewey he distinguishes two kinds of meanings of "to value": (1) direct experience of finding of value quality in what is presented; and (2) appraisals or proper value judgments which predict the occurrence of a value experience "under certain circumstances and on particular occasions." The predictions or accrual of value qualities are capable of verifications in the same manner as any factual judgments. Lewis distinguishes three kinds of value:

intrinsic or immediate satisfactions, extrinsic or the possibility of objects to materialize as directly experienced intrinsic values, and inherent values which denote the presence of qualities in an object itself to which a value is attributed.

Dewey's influence is apparent in the remarkable book The Sources of Value by Stephen C. Pepper. Our voluntary purposive activity discloses three major values: conative, affective, and achievement values. Pepper disclosed the intimate relationship of subjective and objective elements in all these values. All of these values create their own norm or selective system, by which valuations become more and more effective. The oughtness or obligatory element in valuation is a kind of "is".

Like Dewey, he points out the results of learning of empirical trials within the dynamics of valuations.

Bertrand Russell (1872-)

Although Russell's major contributions are in the fields of logic, epistemology, and mathematics, he has been preoccupied with ethical problems all the time. As one of the most courageous champions of a better society, a more universal and more rational one, Russell could not help studying the given value theories. His contributions are not original, nevertheless impressive. The difficulty is to classify his axiological commitment. In his essay "The Elements of Ethics" (published in Readings in Ethical Theory by Sellers and Hospers) 'Russell embraces Moore's intuitionism. Good as an intrinsic value is indefinable.

Like Moore he interprets the right in teleological terms, as any action which leads to enlargements of the good. In his Religion and Science he embraces the emotive theory of values. Questions of value lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. A disagreement of values is a disagreement of taste. Our value judgments express our feelings and desires. When a man says "this is good in itself" he seems to be making a statement, just as much as if he had said "this is a square" or "this is sweet." I believe this to be a mistake. I think that what the man really means is: "Wish everybody to desire this," or rather "Would that everybody desired this". "In his latest publications, predominantly in Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, Russell moves toward an axiological naturalism. Here he defines good as a feeling of enjoyment and satisfaction. On the basis of this intrinsic good we may arrive at true statements concerning right and wrong. The acts approved of as right are

likely to have effects of certain kinds defined as good; wrong are acts which have effects defined as bad. Approval thus is not a final datum.

It may be right or wrong. These definitions and propositions, if accepted‹ provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science. Unlike value emotivists and subjectivists, Russell does not subscribe to the belief that satisfactions and desires are beyond appraisals. He forcibly and convincingly argues for a social, rational ethics which treats desires (like Dewey) in their special concomitants and consequences, for an ethics of enduring satisfactions, for com-possible, harmonious desires‹ for an ethics of cooperation. Such an ethics distinguishes desires as right and wrong. "Right desires will be those that are capable of being com-possible with as many other desires as possible; wrong desires will be those that can only be satisfied by thwarting other desires." Such an ethics discloses that general goods are more rational than partial, that injunctions may be classified as obsolete, out of context of reality, and efficient norms embedded in the texture of social living. Russell, like Dewey, is motivated by the belief that a better knowledge of human nature and intelligence in appraisals are the best methods in ascertaining true values.

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